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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On October 14, 2001, California Governor Gray Davis signed 
Assembly bill 25 into law, granting certain civic rights to state-registered 
domestic partners.1  The Governor praised the bill as “one of the 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2003, University of San Diego School of Law.  The author 
gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and support offered by her parents, James 
and Joanne Callan, and by Professor Grayson McCouch. 
 1. Letter from Gray Davis, Governor of the State of California, to the Members 
of the California Legislature (Oct. 14, 2001), reprinted in 2001–02 CAL. LEG. ASSEMB. J. 
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strongest domestic partner laws in the nation.”2  The legislation has been 
lauded by many in popular debate as a triumph for lesbian and gay rights 
and senior citizen rights.3  Assembly bill 25 (AB 25) includes an unusual 
grouping of couples within its scope of eligibility: not only same-sex 
couples who cannot legally marry, but also certain opposite-sex couples 
who could marry under California law.4  The bill excludes from 
eligibility any opposite-sex couples in which both partners are younger 
than age sixty-two.5 
Is there some explanation for including these groups within one 
statutory alternative to marriage?  Does AB 25 seek to promote state 
recognition of same-sex couples or to codify new representations of 
family or to preserve senior citizens rights or all of the above?  Can these 
potential motivations for a statutory alternative to marriage coexist 
within one scheme, and if so, should that scheme exclude younger, 
opposite-sex couples?  This Comment seeks to parse the statute, provide 
some background to the development of the current scheme, and, finally, 
examine whether any coherent policy supports the statute’s expansion to 
include greater numbers of opposite-sex couples. 
At the outset, Part II examines in detail the substantive benefits that 
California domestic partnerships provide and to whom those benefits are 
offered.6  Part III of this Comment examines the background of the 
current domestic partnership scheme in California by way of comparison 
to the methods used by other states (at either the state or municipal level) 
to address the needs of nontraditional couples and families.7  Most 
notably, the current statute expands eligibility of domestic partnerships 
to include opposite-sex couples in which only one partner is elderly,8 
 
4095, 4175 (2001) [hereinafter Letter from Gray Davis]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Press Release, California Western School of Law, Domestic 
Partnership Scholar Lauds Judiciary Committee’s Approval of Assembly Bill 25 (Mar. 
15, 2001), http://www.cwsl.edu/main/default.asp?nav=news.asp&body=news/2001_03 
_15.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release, California Western School 
of Law].  See generally Robert Salladay & Christopher Heredia, Domestic Partners’ 
Benefits Boosted: State Adds Health Care and Adoption Rights, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 
2001, at A1. 
 4. Assemb. B. 25, 2000–01 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001); see also CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 297(b)(6) (West Supp. 2003). 
 5. See Assemb. B. 25. 
 6. See discussion infra Part II.A–B. 
 7. See discussion infra Part III. 
 8. For the purposes of this Comment, unless otherwise noted, the terms “elderly,” 
“senior citizen” and “retirement age”  refer to individuals over age sixty-two because an 
individual at that age becomes eligible to be a partner in a California opposite-sex 
domestic partnership.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6).  The Author notes that the use of 
these terms to refer to sixty-two year olds is likely outdated with respect to general 
trends of retirement and lifespan. 
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whereas the earlier version had required that both members of an 
opposite-sex couple be over age sixty-two.9 
Part IV examines the legislative history of AB 25 in search of a policy 
behind expansion.10  In light of the absence of a stated policy to support 
expansion, and in light of a lack of printed discussions at hearings on the 
topic, Part V analyzes three possible purposes behind expanding eligibility 
for domestic partnerships.11 
This Comment concludes that a single concrete policy behind 
expansion cannot be identified, but offers suggestions to Californians 
and the California Legislature regarding the likely purpose behind 
expansion.  Furthermore, the likely policies that support expansion of 
eligibility to a still limited class of opposite-sex couples are problematic.  
To carve out a remedy for a class of persons who are legally ineligible to 
marry may be a legitimate policy and goal.  To then incrementally add 
the eligibility of persons who can marry, however, indicates a different 
purpose altogether and raises concerns about the legitimacy of the 
proffered policy. 
Additionally, the Author hopes that the following discussion may 
provide some guidance to states that consider following California’s 
domestic partnership model by recommending that a clear policy behind 
eligibility be adopted and defended. 
II.  WHAT DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP OFFERS AND TO WHOM 
Authored by Assemblywoman Carole Migden and given effect on 
January 1, 2002,12 AB 25 offers expressly delineated civic rights to 
domestic partners who qualify under the terms of the statute and who 
register with the California Secretary of State.13  This Part discusses the 
details of the bill, the substantive rights offered, and the couples who are 
eligible to register as domestic partners. 
A.  Whose Rights?  Those Eligible to Register as Domestic Partners 
Domestic partners are defined as “two adults who have chosen to 
share one another’s lives in an intimate and committed relationship of 
 
 9. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 10. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 11. See discussion infra Part V. 
 12. Assemb. B. 25, 2000–01 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001). 
 13. See Assemb. B. 25; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(9). 
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mutual caring.”14  This definition immediately presents problems with 
factual determination.  Precisely, what is a “committed relationship of 
mutual caring”?15  An answer to that question, to the extent one exists, 
may be provided by the structure and language of the other statutory 
requirements.  A domestic partnership is deemed to satisfy this initially 
vague definition when the couple qualifies to be registered as a domestic 
partnership by satisfying all of nine requirements that follow in the next 
subsection of the statute.16 
Potential domestic partners must share a common residence17 and 
agree to be jointly responsible18 for each other’s basic living expenses19 
during the partnership.20  Neither person may be married nor a member 
of another domestic partnership, and the two may not be related by 
blood to a degree that would prevent them from marrying in California.21  
Both persons must be at least eighteen years of age, must be capable of 
consenting to the partnership, and neither may have previously filed a 
Declaration of Domestic Partnership that has not been officially 
terminated.22  An application for Declaration of Domestic Partnership 
must be filed with the Secretary of State.23 
The application requires that the partners (1) declare they meet the 
 
 14. Assemb. B. 25 § 3 (codified as amended at CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a)). 
 15. Id. 
 16. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b).  The “intimate and committed relationship of 
mutual caring” definition appears first, in subsection (a) of section 297 of the California 
Family Code.  Id. § 297(a).  Then, subsection (b) states that “a domestic partnership shall 
be established” when all nine of the requirements are satisfied.  Id. § 297(b).  The ninth 
requirement is the filing of registration.  Id. § 297 (b)(9).  Presumably, that final act of 
registration will create a presumption that the other requirements were met, should a 
challenge ever ensue. 
 17. “Common residence” does not require that “the legal right to possess the 
common residence be in both of [the domestic partners’] names.”  Id. § 297(c).  “Two 
people have a common residence even if one or both have additional residences.  
Domestic partners do not cease to have a common residence if one leaves the common 
residence but intends to return.”  Id. 
 18. “Joint responsibility,” as defined in the California Family Code, does not 
immediately implicate mutual responsibility to third-party creditors.  Instead, third 
parties may be able to rely on this relationship for payments due if, “in extending the 
credit or providing goods or services, they relied on the existence of the domestic 
partnership and the agreement of both partners to be jointly responsible for those specific 
expenses.”  Id. § 297(e). 
 19. These expenses include: “shelter, utilities, and all other costs directly related to 
the maintenance of the common household . . . [or] any other cost, such as medical care, 
if some or all of the cost is paid as a benefit because a person is another person’s 
domestic partner.”  Id. § 297(d). 
 20. Id. § 297(b)(1), (2). 
 21. Id. § 297(b)(3), (4). 
 22. Id. § 297(b)(5), (7), (8). 
 23. Id. § 298.5.  For a copy of the Declaration of Domestic Partnership form, see 
State of California, Declaration of Domestic Partnership, http://www.ss.ca.gov/business/s 
f/forms/sf-dp1.pdf  (last visited Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Declaration of DP]. 
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nine requirements of domestic partnership provided in section 297 of the  
Family Code; (2) provide a mailing address;24 (3) sign the form with a 
declaration that “representations herein are true, correct, and contain no 
material omissions of fact to our best knowledge and belief;”25 and (4) 
notarize both signatures.26  The registration also requires payment of a 
fee.27  As of February 2003, the required filing fee is ten dollars.28 
Finally, the couple must qualify as one of two classes: either (1) both 
individuals must be of the same sex or (2) one or both of the individuals 
must meet the eligibility criteria under Title II29 or Title XVI30 of the 
Social Security Act and one or both individuals must be over the age of 
sixty-two.31  In short, in an opposite-sex couple, at least one member 
must be over age sixty-two. 
The structure and effect of the bill suggest that, at its essence, the 
domestic partnership intends to provide civic rights to those who cannot 
marry.  Oddly, though, the domestic partnership model expanded in 
2001 to include more couples for whom marriage is currently a lawful 
option: opposite-sex couples in which only one partner is above age 
sixty-two.32 
The original California domestic partnership legislation, Assembly bill 
26,33 offered partnership status to all same-sex couples and to those 
opposite-sex couples who were eligible for marriage, only if both 
individuals were (1) over the age of sixty-two and (2) eligible for either 
old age insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act as 
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 402(a), or qualified as aged individuals under 
Title XVI of the Social Security Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1381.34 
 
 24. The primary residential address provided on this application form will be 
publicly available through the secretary of state.  84 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 55–56 (2001) 
(discussing the policies supporting public disclosure, despite some potential for 
harassment or “social stigma”).   
 25. Declaration of DP, supra note 23. 
 26. CAL. FAM. CODE § 298(c)(4); see also Declaration of DP, supra note 23. 
 27. CAL. FAM. CODE § 298(b)(2); see also Declaration of DP, supra note 23. 
 28. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 21922 (2002); see also Declaration of DP, supra 
note 23. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2000). 
 30. Id. § 1381. 
 31. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6). 
 32. Assemb. B. 25 § 3, 2000–01 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001). 
 33. Assemb. B. 26, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999), 1999 Cal. Stat. 588. 
 34. Id.  
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B.  Rights Gained 
California AB 25 opens with the statement that domestic partners shall 
be entitled to “recover for damages for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress” to the same extent that spouses are so entitled under state law.35  
Immediately thereafter, section 2 gives standing to surviving domestic 
partners in actions of wrongful death or neglect.36  Interestingly, these 
policy changes are announced before the parameters of a domestic 
partnership are statutorily defined.  This overall statutory structure 
indicates, in part, the bill’s purpose. 
Many Californians, and especially members of same-sex couples, 
were outraged by the compelling story of Ms. Dianne Whipple and Ms. 
Sherry Smith.  Ms. Whipple, who was killed by two large dogs in the 
hall outside her San Francisco apartment,37 had been in a long term, 
committed lesbian relationship with Ms. Smith.  Despite the nature of 
their relationship, Ms. Smith lacked standing to sue for wrongful death.38  
If marriage had been a viable option and had they been married, Ms. 
Smith would have had standing to sue for her partner’s wrongful death.  
Eventually, Ms. Smith was granted standing by Judge A. James 
Robertson II, based upon the finding that to deny Ms. Smith’s claim was 
to deny her equal protection in violation of the California Constitution.39  
AB 25 responded to the social realities and legal needs of domestic 
partners in positions like Dianne Whipple and Sherry Smith.   
Within both the San Francisco community and the gay and lesbian 
community of California, the spark was ignited by this story before the 
court granted standing.40  The substantive rights offered by the 2001 
legislation, especially standing for wrongful death and intentional 
 
 35. Assemb. B. 25 § 1, 2000–01 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001); see also CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1714.01 (West Supp. 2003). 
 36. Assemb. B. 25 § 2; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West Supp. 
2003). 
 37. See Michael Pena et al., Powerful Dogs Maul Woman, Kill Her, SF Neighbors’ 
Pets Lunged Down Hallway, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 27, 2001, at A1. 
 38. See Louise Rafkin, Marriage: A Privilege or a Right? The Death of a Partner 
Changed One Woman’s Opinion on the Validity of Gay Marriage, S.F. CHRON. MAG., 
Jan. 20, 2002, at 16.  The article discusses AB 25 as a response to Ms. Smith’s struggle 
to gain standing for her wrongful death claim, despite the fact that the initial draft of AB 
25, on December 4, 2000, preceded Ms. Whipple’s death by approximately one month.  
Compare id., with Assemb. B. 25. 
 39. Order Overruling Defendant’s Demurrer and Denying Defendant’s Motion to 
Strike at 2, Smith v. Knoller, No. 319532 (Cal. Super. Ct., order filed Aug. 9, 2001) 
(“Plaintiff also asserts that reading the wrongful death statute to exclude her claim denies 
her equal protection based upon her sexual orientation in violation of Cal. Const., art. I, 
sec. 7.  The court agrees.”), http://www.nclrights.org/publications/pubs/ smith_order.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2003); see also Rafkin, supra note 38. 
 40. See Christopher Heredia, Mauled S.F. Woman’s Partner Files Wrongful Death 
Lawsuit, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 13, 2001, at A21. 
PRINTERCALLAN.DOC 1/30/2020  11:02 AM 
[VOL. 40:  427, 2003]  California Domestic Partnerships 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 433 
infliction of emotional distress claims, would subsequently have more 
passionate and widespread support than ever before. 
After the introduction regarding standing for wrongful death suits, the 
language of AB 25 proceeds to define the domestic partnership and 
eligible members.41  Once the scope is defined, the bill then describes 
other substantive rights and obligations.  The California Family Code is 
amended to allow a domestic partner to file for adoption of a partner’s 
child.42  The California Government Code now provides that a domestic 
partner, a child of a domestic partner, and a surviving domestic partner 
will each be considered a family member for certain purposes of the 
Code.43  Additionally, the Government Code is amended to extend 
certain spousal benefits to domestic partners who have been registered 
with the state for at least a year prior to a partner’s retirement or death 
prior to retirement.44  All of these changes reflect a general desire to 
address the needs of the changing face of the California family. 
As of January 1, 2002, the California Insurance Code and the Health 
and Safety Code both provide that domestic partners are eligible for 
coverage under an employee’s healthcare service plan offering medical, 
hospital, surgical, or expense benefits.45  That coverage may be terminated, 
however, if the partnership is terminated.46  Employees are also now 
authorized to take sick leave to attend to the illness of a domestic partner 
or the child of a domestic partner.47  The employee-related benefits are 
extensions of the initial domestic partnership model, first developed by 
employers and municipalities.48 
Changes to the California Probate Code are substantial.49  Property 
rights, however, are not affected by AB 25, and rights to inherit by 
intestacy, while initially included as part of AB 25, were eventually 
removed.50  California’s intestacy scheme extends to domestic partnerships 
 
 41. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 42. Assemb. B. 25 § 5, 2000–01 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (codified as amended 
at CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West Supp. 2003)). 
 43. Id. § 9 (codified as amended at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 22871.2 (West Supp. 
2003)). 
 44. Id. § 9.5 (codified as amended at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 31780.2). 
 45. Id. §§ 10–11 (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.58 
(West Supp. 2003); CAL. INS. CODE § 10121.7 (West Supp. 2003)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. § 12 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE § 233(a) (West Supp. 2003)). 
 48. See infra notes 69–88 and accompanying text. 
 49. See generally Assemb. B. 25 §§ 13–55. 
 50. Compare id. § 4 (codified as amended at CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.5 (West Supp. 
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by virtue of Assembly bill 2216, approved on September 10, 2002.51  
Effective July 1, 2003, a surviving domestic partner gains the same 
intestate share as a surviving spouse.52 
Much as the compelling story of Ms. Whipple and Ms. Smith spurred 
legal recognition of same-sex partners, the tragedy of September 
eleventh encouraged this addition to the domestic partnership scheme.  
One of the flight attendants on American Airlines flight eleven, Mr. Jeff 
Collman, lost his life when the plane crashed into the World Trade 
Center.53  Mr. Collman was survived by his life partner of eleven years, 
Mr. Keith Bradkowski. The couple believed, at the time of its creation, 
that their domestic partnership status included intestacy rights.54  In the 
wake of publication surrounding their story, AB 2216 was enacted, 
adding to the rights earlier guaranteed by AB 25.55 
Changes to the probate scheme offered by AB 25 include that domestic 
partners are now entitled to notice of petition for conservatorship.56  
Domestic partners may also nominate conservators.57  Domestic partners 
will be preferred as proposed conservators and administrators, equating 
treatment to that of spouses.58  Petitions to terminate a conservatorship, 
for transfer, for appointment of successor conservator, or for court order, 
may be filed by a domestic partner.59  Domestic partners may authorize 
and receive payments from the surplus income of the estate upon 
petition or to cover basic living expenses of the domestic partner.60  
Finally, the revised Probate Code reflects that an incapacitated patient’s 
domestic partner will have the same authority to make healthcare 
decisions as would a spouse.61 
Additional amendments allow domestic partners a California state tax 
deduction for certain medical and healthcare expenses.62  Under the 
 
2003)), with Assem. B. 25 § 2 (as introduced). 
 51. Assemb. B. 2216, 2001–02 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (codified as amended 
at CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6401–6402 (West Supp. 2003) (effective July 1, 2003)). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Gay Partner of 9/11 Victim and Lambda Legal Lawyer to Attend Signing of 
Bill Providing Inheritance Rights to Domestic Partners (Sept. 10, 2002), at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1139 (last visited Feb. 
6, 2003). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Assemb. B. 25 § 14, 2000–01 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (codified as 
amended at CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (West 2002)). 
 57. Id. § 15 (codified as amended at CAL. PROB. CODE § 1811). 
 58. Id. § 16 (codified as amended at CAL. PROB. CODE § 1812). 
 59. Id. § 16.5 (codified as amended at CAL. PROB. CODE § 1813.1). 
 60. Id. § 34 (codified as amended at CAL. PROB. CODE § 2423). 
 61. Id. § 49 (codified as amended at CAL. PROB. CODE § 4716 (West Supp. 2003)). 
 62. Id. § 56 (codified as amended at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17021.7 (West 
Supp. 2003)). 
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California Unemployment Code, good cause is established if an 
employee leaves work voluntarily to accompany a domestic partner to a 
new location from which it is impractical to commute.63  Individuals 
eligible for disability benefits may have a claim filed on their behalf by a 
domestic partner if the individual is mentally incapable of making the 
claim.64 
All of the above changes to California law make AB 25 one of the 
more aggressive legislative efforts to add rights to domestic partnerships 
of various types.65  Although there are certainly couples for whom such 
rights will be a welcome improvement, the statutory creations are not 
without challenges and potential problems. 
Some members of the California Assembly have argued that such 
legislation is simply wrong or ill-advised because it begins to undermine 
the legal rights of marriage.66  Others have asserted that the bill has not 
gone far enough: either in recognizing same-sex couples who are 
committed to one another for life and justifiably expect state recognition 
of their relationship, or in providing state-sanctioned rights and 
 
[Domestic partners] shall be treated as the spouse of the taxpayer for the 
purposes of applying only Sections 105(b) [amounts received under accident 
and health plans], 106(a) [contributions by employer to accident and health 
plans], 162(l) [health insurance costs of self-employed individuals], 162(n) 
[trade or business expenses for certain group health plans], and 213(a) 
[deductions for medical and dental expenses] of the Internal Revenue Code 
and for purposes of determining whether an individual is the taxpayer’s 
“dependant” or “member of their family” as these terms are used in those 
sections. 
Id. 
 63. Id. § 58 (codified as amended at CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1032(c) (West 
Supp. 2003)). 
 64. Id. § 60 (codified as amended at CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2705.1). 
 65. Letter from Gray Davis, supra note 1.  Compare Assemb. B. 25, with 1997 
Haw. Sess. Laws 383.  The California scheme may be described as an aggressive 
legislative effort, in the sense that only three states currently offer statewide recognition 
of domestic partnerships, including Vermont, which offers the civil union.  See 
discussion supra Part III.C. 
 66. See Press Release, California State Assembly Republican Caucus, Domestic 
Partners Bill Moves to Governor: “Marriage Rights Are Only for a Man and a Woman,” 
Says Hollingsworth (Sept. 12, 2001), http://republican.assembly.ca.gov/members/66/ 
PressRelease3750.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2002) (on file with author); Press Release, 
California State Assembly Republican Caucus, Wyman Opposes Legislation 
Undermining Marriage: Wyman Calls Upon Governor Davis to Protect Marriage 
Between a Man and a Woman (Sept. 12, 2001), available at hhtp://republican.assembly. 
ca.gov/members/34/PressRelease3778.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2002) (on file with 
author); see also Jenifer Warren, Bill Expanding Domestic Partners’ Rights Signed, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at B6. 
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responsibilities.67  Most likely, Californians will similarly respond by 
dividing into these two camps.  Although either perspective might be 
defended, it remains unclear why the legislature has made the changes 
that it has.  Significant changes to substantive law have not clarified the 
motivating force for a statutory exception to marriage that includes 
same-sex couples and only those opposite-sex couples in which one 
individual is over age sixty-two. 
III.  BACKGROUND IN CALIFORNIA AND COMPARATIVE MODELS 
In order to understand the origin, purpose, and effect of domestic 
partnership laws, some comparison to the various other domestic 
partnership models is required.  Although this Comment does not 
attempt exhaustive survey of legislation or case law in other jurisdictions, 
a thorough critique of California’s legislative model and its challenges 
must include an exposition of the statute’s development and a basic 
comparison to the models in other states and jurisdictions.68 
A.  Municipalities and Employers 
The California domestic partnership emerged initially from municipal 
ordinances, rather than from statewide action.69  Many state constitutions 
provide latitude for municipalities to offer substantive rights to same-sex 
couples, even though statewide legislation declines to guarantee those 
same protections.70  Throughout California, cities recognized domestic 
 
 67. On January 28, 2003, Assembly bill 205 was read for the first time and 
proposed to enact the California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 
2003.  Assemb. B. 205, 2003–04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).  If enacted, it would 
extend to domestic partners the rights and responsibilities of marriage as of January 1, 
2005.  Id.  More importantly, this bill reinforces that the driving policy behind domestic 
partnerships has little or nothing to do with senior citizens, rather much or everything to 
do with same-sex couples.  Id. § 1(8)(J)(11)–(12) (discussing equal protection and sex 
discrimination as reasons to expand rights and responsibilities to domestic partners, even 
though the current scheme excludes only certain opposite-sex couples).  For an example 
of popular reaction to AB 25’s progress as insufficient, see Press Release, People For the 
American Way, California Takes Two Steps Forward (Oct. 19, 2001), http://www.pfaw. 
org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=1887 (last visited Feb. 6, 2003). 
 68. For a discussion of Canada’s current treatment of same-sex partners and 
emerging family relationships, see generally Nicole LaViolette, Waiting in a New Line at 
City Hall: Registered Partnerships as an Option for Relationship Recognition Reform in 
Canada, 19 CAN. J. FAM. L. 115 (2002). 
 69. See Sanford N. Katz, Emerging Models for Alternatives to Marriage, 33 FAM. 
L.Q. 663, 668–75 (1999); see also Heidi Eischen, For Better or Worse: An Analysis of 
Recent Challenges to Domestic Partner Benefits Legislation, 31 TOL. L. REV. 527, 530–31 
(2000). 
 70. See Katz, supra note 69, at 669 (citing Vada Berger, Domestic Partnership 
Initiatives, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 437 (1991)); see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43B, § 
13 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
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partnerships in an effort to provide substantive rights to the 
nontraditional families of workers. 71 
Cities in other states also offer municipal domestic partnerships.72  For 
example, in 1989, the city of New York recognized domestic 
partnerships by executive order of then-Mayor Edward Koch.73  In 1998, 
then-Mayor Giuliani expanded the initial Domestic Partnership Registry.74 
The New York City domestic partnership model requires only that (1) 
both partners be residents of the city of New York or that one be an 
employee of the city; (2) both are over age eighteen; (3) neither partner 
is married; (4) neither is, or has recently been, party to another domestic 
partnership; (5) the partners are not related to one another in a manner 
that would bar marriage in the state of New York; and (6) the “persons 
have a close and committed personal relationship, live together and have 
been living together on a continuous basis.”75 
The New York model differs from California’s, most significantly, in 
that gender is not mentioned at all in the New York City model.76  
Therefore, there is no limitation on opposite-sex couples’ eligibility, 
provided the partners are not closely related.77  Although California’s 
model also contains a limitation on blood relation, the California 
 
 71. Cities in California that offered a local ordinance recognizing domestic 
partnerships and offering registration include: San Francisco, Berkeley, Laguna Beach, 
Long Beach, Los Angeles, Oakland, Palo Alto, Sacramento, Santa Barbara, and West 
Hollywood.  Katz, supra note 69, at 669–70.  The first city to pass a domestic 
partnership ordinance was Berkeley, California in 1984.  Debbie Zielinski, Domestic 
Partnerships Benefits: Why Not Offer Them to Same-Sex Partners and Unmarried 
Opposite Sex Partners?, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 281, 290 (1998–99). 
 72. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-241 (2001); BOSTON, MASS. PUB. 
HEALTH & WELFARE ORDINANCE ch. 12-9A.1 (1993). 
 73. Reneé M. Scire & Christopher A. Raimondi, Employment Benefits: Will Your 
Significant Other Be Covered?, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357, 362 (2000). 
 74. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-241.  Press Release, Rudolph W. Giuliani, 
Mayor Giuliani Signs Landmark Domestic Partnership Legislation (July 7, 1998), 
http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/html/98b/pr319-98.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2003) 
[hereinafter Press Release, Rudolph W. Giuliani].  The city’s recognition of domestic 
partnerships was affirmed after a taxpayer challenge in Slattery v. City of New York, 697 
N.Y.S.2d 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
 75. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-241. 
 76. Id.  In support of the New York City domestic partnership legislation, Mayor 
Giuliani praised the importance of the registration, in part, because of its wide 
applicability.  “As of April 1998, there were approximately 8,700 couples registered as 
domestic partners in New York City.  More than 55 percent . . . were heterosexual 
couples, and less than 45 percent were same sex couples.”  Press Release, Rudolph W. 
Giuliani, supra note 74. 
 77. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-241. 
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eligibility requirements focus on the gender of the partners.78 
The city of Cambridge led the way in Massachusetts, offering a 
domestic partnership registration in 1992.79  Boston followed a year 
later.80  In 1998, although an expanded domestic partnership bill passed 
in the Massachusetts House and Senate, the Governor vetoed the bill.81  
Portions of Massachusetts municipal ordinances were successfully 
challenged in Connors v. City of Boston, which limited the use of public 
funds to pay benefits.82  However, the crusade for Massachusetts’s 
domestic partnerships had begun. 
The 2001 Massachusetts Legislature considered a bill that would have 
given statewide effect to the domestic partnership legislation that 
emerged from Cambridge and Boston.83  The Massachusetts approach 
largely approximated the New York City model, in that it requires for 
eligibility that partners (1) share a residence and financial expenses; (2) 
be over age eighteen and competent; (3) are not related by blood to a 
degree closer than would bar marriage in Massachusetts; (4) are not 
married to another; (5) reside together as exclusive partners; and (6) are 
in a relationship of “mutual support, caring and commitment.”84 
In addition to the efforts of cities to protect citizens and families, 
employers recognized and offered benefits to couples who had made a 
long-term commitment.85  The crucial role that employment benefits 
play in the American family has led many employers to offer nonspousal 
benefits to domestic couples of any gender.86  After cities and employers 
led the way for the recognition of nontraditional couples, the states  
followed in an attempt to provide statutory recognition and relief to 
modern families. 
 
 78. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6)(A) (West Supp. 2003). 
 79. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 2.119 (1992). 
 80. BOSTON, MASS., PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE ORDINANCE ch. 12-9A (1993). 
 81. See Tatsha Robertson, Edict Expected on Partner Benefits; Mayor’s Order 
Would Bypass Critics, Expand Coverage for Gay Families, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 
1998, at B1. 
 82. Connors v. City of Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1999).  The court found 
that the mayoral executive order was inconsistent with state insurance law.  Id. at 339. 
 83. S.B. 2123, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2001).  The Massachusetts House 
Ways and Means Committee is currently reviewing the text of S.B. 2123.  This proposed 
version of the bill, if passed, would resemble the current Boston and New York City 
models in terms of eligibility requirements.  Id. 
 84. Id. § 2(d 1/2). 
 85. M.R. Carrillo-Heian, Domestic Partnership in California: Is It a Step Toward 
Marriage?, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 475, 481–82 (1999).  For a discussion of how 
California municipalities and employers responded to the demand for equal benefits in 
the emerging definition of family by recognizing domestic partnerships, see Grace Ganz 
Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities 
in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1280–81 (2001). 
 86. See Blumberg, supra note 85, at 1282–92. 
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California’s original domestic partnership status emerged in 2000.87  
The substantive rights offered to registered couples through this model 
differ from the models of other states.  For the purposes of this Comment, 
the crucial comparison is less the rights available after registration and more 
the eligibility requirements preceding it.  Therefore, a brief comparison of 
California’s current domestic partnership to other states’ recognition of 
same-sex and nontraditional couples follows.88 
B.  Hawaii’s Reciprocal Beneficiaries 
Hawaii preceded California in state recognition of same-sex couples 
and nontraditional families.  The Reciprocal Beneficiary Statute was 
enacted in 1997, allowing same-sex and certain other couples to register 
as state recognized partnerships.89 
Like California, the Hawaii model did not begin with reference 
specifically to same-sex couples.  Rather, the Hawaii Intermediate Court 
of Appeals began in the early 1980s to address the changing face of the 
family in several crucial divorce decisions amidst the move to no-fault 
divorce.90  The partnership model suggested that marriage was similar to 
a business partnership, in which both parties have rights and obligations 
and work towards joint contributions.91 
In the 1990s, three same-sex couples filed suit in Hawaii state court 
alleging that denial of their marriage request violated their privacy and 
equal protection rights as guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution.92  The 
 
 87. See generally Assemb. B. 26, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). 
 88. Arizona is currently considering the enactment of a domestic partnership 
statute, although it did not previously offer that status through city ordinances.  H.B. 
2301, 45th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2002), available at http://www.azleg.state.az.us/ 
legtext/45leg/2r/bills/hb2301p.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003); H.B. 2309, 45th Leg., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2002), available at http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/45leg/2r/bills/hb 
2309p.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).  Discussion of these bills is omitted from the 
comparison, due to their recent sponsorship and support.  Should they pass in their 
proposed form, the Arizona scheme would depart from California’s in that there is no 
mention of the genders of the respective partners, but would approximate the California 
scheme in its exclusion of close blood relatives and requirements for a committed 
relationship intended to “last forever.”  Id. 
 89. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-5 (2001). 
 90. Calvin G.C. Pang, Slow-Baked, Flash-Fried, Not to Be Devoured: 
Development of the Partnership Model of Property Division in Hawai’i and Beyond, 20 
U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1998). 
 91. Id. at 2–3 (citing Amy Kastely, An Essay in Family Law: Property Division, 
Alimony, Child Support, and Child Custody, 6 U. HAW. L. REV. 381, 390–91 (1984)). 
 92. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 49–50 (Haw. 1993). 
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Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin, found that the couples’ 
inability to obtain a marriage license was discrimination on the basis of 
sex, and the court remanded for hearings on whether the marriage 
license law furthered a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored.93  
Although the state could not meet its burden of proving a state interest in 
the refusal to recognize same-sex couples, any recognition of same-sex 
marriages was halted by an ballot initiative restricting marriages to 
opposite-sex couples.94 
Language from the partnership models of the 1980s was revisited and 
allowed a wider lens through which family relationships would be 
viewed in Hawaii.95  The initial 1997 legislation to create reciprocal 
beneficiaries emerged from this developing understanding of marriage 
and family: “[T]he legislature concurrently acknowledges that there are 
many individuals who have significant personal, emotional, and 
economic relationships with another individual yet are prohibited by 
such legal restrictions from marrying.”96  Specifically named as intended 
beneficiaries, then, are “a widowed mother and her unmarried son” or a 
same-sex couple.97 
Like the California domestic partnership statute, Hawaii limits the 
rights and benefits extended to same-sex couples within the statutory 
construction.  “[T]he rights and benefits extended by this Act shall be 
narrowly interpreted and nothing in this Act shall be construed nor implied 
to create or extend rights or benefits not specifically provided herein.”98 
Substantively, Hawaii’s reciprocal beneficiary status offers similar 
benefits to the California scheme.  Like California, Hawaii offers 
 
 93. Id. at 67. 
 94. Jeffery Hubins, Proposition 22: Veiled Discrimination or Sound Constitutional 
Law?, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 239, 248 (2001). 
 95. Following Baehr and its effects, a similar effort began in Alaska.  See 
generally Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 21 P.3d 357, 357–58 (Alaska 2001) 
(holding that the controversy was not ripe for adjudication when a same-sex couple 
challenged ineligibility for marriage on federal and state constitutional grounds).  Unlike 
Hawaii, however, Alaska did not respond to that litigation with an attempt to allow a 
statutory alternative to marriage for same-sex couples.  Instead, a constitutional amendment 
was proposed and later passed limiting marriage as only between a man and a woman.  
See Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on 
the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 213, 217–19 (1999).  For a discussion of that 
amendment, see id. at 246–68.  In comparison, California voters passed proposition 22, a 
state defense of marriage act, that limited the definition of marriage between a man and a 
woman.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West Supp. 2003).  However, the California 
Legislature evidently remained open to alternative, statutory methods of recognizing and 
providing benefits to same-sex couples.  See generally  Assemb. B. 25, 2000–01 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001); Assemb. B. 26, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). 
 96. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 (Supp. 2001). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. § 572C-1, editor’s note (quoting 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383, § 74). 
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benefits in employment,99 insurance,100 taxation,101 hospital visitation 
and health care protection,102 probate,103 and standing for tort claims.104  
In addition to these common benefits, Hawaii offers additional rights to 
same-sex couples beyond California’s model, including social services, 
limited property rights, and eligibility for loans.105  The Supreme Court 
of Hawaii recently expanded tort claims for reciprocal beneficiaries to 
include a cause of action for negligent handling of a corpse or preparation 
for crematory services.106 
Hawaii and California share similarities in their statutory approaches 
to the recognition of same-sex couples, especially with respect to the 
substantive rights conferred upon formation of either the reciprocal 
beneficiary or the domestic partnership.  The greatest distinction 
between the two models lies in the definition and scope of eligibility. 
Hawaii’s reciprocal beneficiary status openly states its purpose: to 
provide a statutory remedy to those couples who cannot marry.107  
Necessarily, the statutory alternative to marriage includes opposite-sex 
couples, provided they are “legally prohibited from marrying under state 
law.”108  The purpose of the reciprocal beneficiary, then, differs quite 
markedly from California’s domestic partnership.  While Hawaii seeks 
to provide statutory relief to families109 by including a grandmother and 
grandson living together within the scope of eligibility, California, on 
 
 99. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 83-8, 87-23.5, 386-34, 388-4 (Supp. 2001); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ch. 88 (Supp. 2001). 
 100. Id. §§ 431–432.  For further discussion of the insurance rights affected by the 
reciprocal beneficiary status, see Op. Haw. Att’y Gen. 97-05 (Aug. 14, 1997), 
http://www.state.hi.us/ag/opinions_formal_letters/9705.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2003); 
Op. Haw. Att’y Gen. 97-10 (Dec. 2, 1997), http://www.state.hi.us/ag/opinions_formal_letters 
/9710.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2003). 
 101. HAW. REV. STAT § 247-3 (Supp. 2001). 
 102. Id. §§ 323-2, 324-22, 327-3, 334-6, 334-59, 334-60.4, 334.60.5 (Supp. 2001). 
 103. Id. at ch. 560. 
 104. Id. § 663-1. 
 105. See 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383. 
 106. Guth v. Freeland, 28 P.3d 982, 990 (Haw. 2001). 
 107. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (“The purpose of this chapter is to extend certain 
rights and benefits which are presently available only to married couples to couples 
composed of two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying under state 
law.”).  
 108. Id. 
 109. For a discussion of how health insurance coverage is affected by reciprocal 
beneficiary’s use of “family” (as opposed to “couple”), see Op. Haw. Att’y Gen. 97-10, 
(Dec. 2, 1997), http://www.state.hi.us/ag/opinions_formal_letters/9710.htm (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2003). 
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the other hand, offers domestic partnership to romantic rather than 
blood-related couples.110 
The reciprocal beneficiary model examines eligibility primarily upon 
family structure.111  The California domestic partnership, as currently 
defined, focuses upon the quality of a couple’s relationship.112  Hawaii 
has made clear its policy on advancing the state recognition and support 
of nontraditional families, which include blood-related, nonromantic 
arrangements, through the Reciprocal Beneficiary Statute and earlier 
legislation.113  The policy, if one exists, that drives California’s domestic 
partnership remains murky. 
C.  Vermont’s Civil Unions114 
Vermont officially recognized a civil union for same-sex couples in 
April of 2000.115  Same-sex couples who enter a civil union are entitled 
to the same benefits and responsibilities that exist for married couples 
under Vermont law.116  The enactment of the civil union laws reflected 
an understanding that discrimination against same-sex couples would not 
reflect the purposes of the state’s family law.117 
Unlike the California domestic partnership scheme, Vermont law 
offers registered same-sex partners essentially the same state recognition 
as is offered to traditional marriages, due to the civil union’s grounding 
in the Vermont Constitution.  Relying upon the doctrine that states are 
free to offer greater protection to residents than is offered by the federal 
Constitution, the Vermont state court found that the Vermont Common 
Benefits Clause prevented same-sex couples from being “deprived of the 
statutory benefits and protections afforded persons of the opposite sex 
 
 110. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (West Supp. 2003). 
 111. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1.  
 112. Compare id., with HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1, 572C-4 (Supp. 2000).  
California’s unique approach to defining and identifying a family or couple by the 
quality of the relationship is problematic at best.  Although beyond the scope of this 
Comment, the statute begs the question: should all couples and families be evaluated for 
their “mutual caring” or the degree of their commitment?  If so, the Author respectfully 
suggests that many married couples might fall short of the standard. 
 113. See supra notes 95–97, 107–10 and accompanying text. 
 114. An exhaustive study of the civil union or marriage alternative as recognized in 
Vermont is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 115. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves H. 847, § 3 (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 15, § 1201 (2002)). 
 116. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (relying upon the Common 
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution). 
 117. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the 
Jurisprudence of Civil Unions: The 2000 Edward C. Sobota Lecture, 64 ALB. L. REV. 
853, 859 (2001). 
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who choose to marry.”118  Thus, state constitutional principles, in 
addition to legislative intent, provide the groundwork and support for 
statutory provisions for the Vermont civil union, adopted in 1999.119  
The recently adopted California domestic partnership scheme, however, 
relies entirely upon legislative efforts.120  California domestic partners 
cannot rely, at this time, upon California state constitutional recognition 
or protection. 
Some critics of the Vermont approach have debated the theoretical 
differences between traditional marriage and civil unions in Vermont.  
Opponents of the civil unions generally fall into two main groups.  One 
group opposes same-sex unions on traditional moral grounds with 
concerns of state-sanctioned homosexuality.  The other group objects 
that the law has created a “separate but equal” status for same-sex 
partnerships that further separates them from “full legal equality.”121  
Both reactions in Vermont have relevance for the California domestic 
partnership. 
Opponents of the legal recognition of same-sex couples have tended to 
raise sufficient rancor that California legislation may have innocuously 
included opposite-sex couples within the scope of domestic partnership 
to avert criticism.122  On the other end of the spectrum are those who 
would object to any recognition of same-sex couples that falls short of 
marriage.  To this group, the California domestic partnership is a failed 
remedy, if not an insult.123 
Regardless of popular response, the Vermont law does offer the most 
expansive and complete rights to same-sex couples currently offered by 
any state.  In that sense, Vermont offers a model to emerging California 
law of one possible route for the development of same-sex couples’ 
rights. 
Like Hawaii, Vermont has faced no onslaught of case law in the wake 
of enacting the civil union recognition.  In fact, the Vermont Supreme 
 
 118. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. 
 119. See id.; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2002). 
 120. No California constitutional litigation preceded the legislature’s initiation of 
domestic partnerships or the adoption of section 297 of the California Family Code. 
 121. Eskridge, supra note 117, at 853. 
 122. See infra notes 174–86 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom: A (Conservative) Case for Gay 
Marriage, in BEYOND QUEER: CHALLENGING GAY LEFT ORTHODOXY 252, 254–55 (Bruce 
Bawer ed., 1996). 
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Court has offered few opinions on the subject,124 indicating that 
problems with statutory interpretation have not yet been encountered, if 
they will be at all. 
California will likely face further comparison to Vermont’s civil union 
structure.  In 2001, Assemblyman Paul Koretz introduced Assembly bill 
1338 in California that would authorize civil unions, like those existing 
in Vermont.125  Efforts to equate the rights and responsibilities of 
married couples to same-sex couples continue today.  Assembly bill 205, 
introduced in January of 2003, would grant rights to same-sex partners 
equivalent to those of married couples.126 
IV.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Despite substantive differences in the various states’ approaches to 
recognizing domestic partnerships, certainly the most glaring difference 
in California’s scheme is the inclusion of, and restriction on, opposite-
sex couples.  What policy lies behind California’s initial inclusion of 
opposite-sex couples and then expansion of the statute’s application to 
more opposite-sex couples? 
While the debate over how and when to recognize same-sex couples 
rages on, California complicates the relevant policy with an additional 
factor.  Does the California approach avoid the potential equal protection 
argument against a statute that only recognizes one type of couple?  Or, 
instead, does it dilute the progress and efforts of same-sex couples to 
gain social and political rights and recognition?  The historical development 
of the statutory scheme sheds light on these questions. 
The domestic partnership began with the first reading of AB 26 in 
December of 1998.127  As introduced, the bill defined domestic partnerships 
with the same broad language that later versions continued to use.128  
Requirements followed that initial definition, but nowhere in either the 
 
 124. Brady v. Dean, 790 A.2d 428, 433–35 (Vt. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff 
town clerks failed to show that the civil union law substantially burdened their religious 
beliefs and upholding dismissal of their state constitutional challenge); Baker, 744 A.2d 
at 864. 
 125. Assemblyman Koretz sponsored the bill to introduce civil unions in California, 
then pulled the bill in mid-2001.  Assemb. B. 1338, 2001 Leg., 2001–02 Sess. (Cal. 
2001).  The civil union effort died immediately on February 7, 2002, pursuant to article 
IV, section 10(c) of the California Constitution.  Id.; CAL. CONST. art. IV § 10(c). 
 126. Assemb. B. 205, 2003–04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). 
 127. Assemb. B. 26, 1999 Leg., 1999–2000 Sess. (Cal. 1999) (as introduced Dec. 7, 
1998) (proposing to offer only two substantive rights: (1) allowing health facility 
visitation and (2) providing eligibility for employer-provided health care and disability 
insurance). 
 128. Assemb. B. 26 § 1 (“Domestic partners are two adults who have chosen to 
share one another’s lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring.”). 
PRINTERCALLAN.DOC 1/30/2020  11:02 AM 
[VOL. 40:  427, 2003]  California Domestic Partnerships 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 445 
broad definition or the required elements was there any mention of 
gender.129  Thus, any two people, of any major age or any gender, would 
have been eligible to register as domestic partners under the initial 
drafting.130 
The Assembly Committee on Health commented that the purpose of 
defining the domestic partnership as the bill’s author had done was 
twofold.  First, the problems of health insurance and visitation were 
“particularly acute for same sex couples whose relationships are not 
currently recognized under existing law.”131  Second, those problems 
were shared by “elderly couples who form committed and exclusive 
relationships.”132 
The Committee’s comment gives no further explanation.  The lurking 
question remains: Why do the problems of healthcare insurance and 
health facility visitation affect elderly opposite-sex couples more than 
nonelderly opposite-sex couples?  Granted, the use of healthcare may 
increase with age.  But age is not necessarily relevant to how much 
patients value visitation and coverage rights.  Other factors, such as 
prognosis, length of hospitalization, socioeconomic status, and social 
support are far more salient.  More importantly, the Health Committee’s 
comment discusses the limited group of elderly couples, while the 
applicable draft of the bill makes no such limitation.133  This disconnect 
indicates the trouble that California will have both in delineating 
domestic partnership eligibility and also in providing support for that 
choice. 
The bill’s legislative history catalogued amendments and recommendations 
to the proffered substantive rights.  Alongside substantive fine-tuning, 
the debate over eligibility continued.  A July 1999 comment by the 
 
 129. All requirements, other than the gender of the couples, remain substantially the 
same in all versions of the domestic partnership status.  Occasionally, there has been 
some change in the definition of a term, such as “have a common residence.”  Compare 
Assemb. B. 26 (as introduced), with Assemb. B. 26 (as chaptered) and Assemb. B. 25 (as 
chaptered). 
 130. At no time in any draft did the eligibility requirements permit blood relatives 
who were forbidden by law to marry to enter a domestic partnership. 
 131. Domestic Partnerships; Health Insurance: Hearing on AB 26 Before the 
Assembly Comm. on Health, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (bill analysis 
commenting on purpose of legislation), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/9900/bill/asm/ab 
_0001-0050/ab_26_cfa_19990412_144347_asm_comm.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2003) 
[hereinafter Hearing on AB 26]. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Compare id., with Assemb. B. 25, 2000–01 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001). 
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Senate Judiciary Committee jumped the gun and assumed that problems 
with domestic partnership had been remedied as of that draft.134  In 
reference to previous legislation that was vetoed by Governor Wilson,135 
the Committee noted that prior problems included lack of definition.136  
While true that by the summer of 1999, clear requirements existed for 
eligibility to the domestic partnership, the legislature was still struggling 
with the most basic questions: to whom would these rights be available, 
and why would certain couples be included or excluded? 
The Senate Judiciary Committee further commented that multiple bills 
introduced during the 1999–2000 session had attempted to address the 
changing face of the California family.137  The problem, it seems in 
retrospect, may be that the legislature is not clear on what it or 
Californians are willing to recognize as a family.  While the elected 
representatives might have led Californians to a new understanding of 
state-sanctioned families, they have instead struggled to understand the 
emerging social systems.  That struggle is reflected in the jagged 
progress of their family legislation. 
Between that Senate Judiciary comment, made in July, and the August 
16 issuance of an amended AB 26, the sponsor had adopted a drastic 
change in definition.  All opposite-sex couples were now excluded from 
domestic partnership eligibility under this third draft.138  The multiple 
personalities of early domestic partnership legislation suggest the central 
difficulty.  If the legislature had merely been debating who could visit a 
dying loved one in the hospital, it seems absurd to exclude any member 
of a romantic, committed couple.  In fact, exclusion from that benefit 
 
 134. Domestic Partnerships: Hearing on AB 26 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 
1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/9900/bill/asm/ 
ab_0001-0050/ab_26_cfa_19990708_092134_sen_comm.html (last visited Feb. 6, 
2003).  In the “background” section, the committee discussed that AB 26 (as amended 
Apr. 8, 1999) had remedied the problems of Assemb. B. 1059, 1997 Leg., 1997–98 Sess. 
(Cal. 1997).  Id. at 1–2. 
 135. Assemb. B. 1059, 1997 Leg., 1997–98 Sess. (Cal. 1997). 
 136. The Committee cited to the veto message of Governor Wilson: “The lack of 
definition for ‘domestic partner’ lends itself to instability, fraud and adverse selection?”  
The committee responded to the prior challenge, “The problem of defining ‘domestic 
partner’ has been taken care of by AB 26.”  Hearing on AB 26, supra note 131, at 13–14. 
 137. Id.  Senate bill 75 was a similar bill concurrently being drafted in the Senate 
that was ultimately dropped. S.B. 75, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).  The 
Committee stated that: 
AB 26 would acknowledge that domestic partners, whether they be of the same 
sex or not, should have some rights and privileges even though the sanctions of 
a legal, traditional marriage are not available. . . .  These are major steps in 
filling in the gaps in family law and other areas, where existing law is 
insufficient or non-existent.  
Hearing on AB 26, supra note 131, at 14, § 10. 
 138. Assemb. B. 26 § 1, 1999 Leg., 1999–2000 Sess. (Cal. 1999) (as amended Aug. 
16, 1999) (“Both persons are members of the same sex.”). 
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sounds draconian as applied against any individual wishing to spend 
time with an ill loved one, regardless of relationship type or title. 
The real debate was not about hospital visitation, nor about which 
health benefits might be extended to an employee’s significant other.  
The real debate struggled with defining who would be eligible for these 
rights, and more importantly, who would be eligible for the additional 
rights that surely would follow.139 
As of September 7, 1999, less than one month later, the pendulum had 
swung again.140  The Senate Rules Committee’s comments suggested an 
amendment to “expand coverage of the bill to opposite sex partners who 
are senior citizens 62 years or older and who are eligible for either 
Social Security or SSI, thus making them eligible for benefits provided 
by the bill.”141  In that same report, one argument in support of the 
version offered provided that AB 26 would remedy an equal protection 
problem by providing certain benefits to same-sex couples.  Although 
mentioning elderly couples and opposite-sex couples briefly, the 
arguments in support fail to match up with the eligibility requirements of 
that draft.142 
No one caught the inherent problem of including “unmarried couples” 
as beneficiaries while simultaneously limiting the legislation’s proffered 
protection to only same-sex couples or elderly couples.143  Attached to 
these policy statements suggesting that the domestic partnership should be 
available to any nonmarried couple, the draft provided: “Notwithstanding 
 
 139. See, e.g., Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different 
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1178–80 (1980). 
 140. AB 26: Third Reading: Senate Rules Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2–
3 (Cal. Sept. 7, 1999), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab 
_26_cfa_19990908_174058_sen_floor.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2003). 
 141. Id. at 2.  This was the first time that the language of social security eligibility 
was presented: “Both persons [must] meet the eligibility criteria under Title II of the 
Social Security Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 402(a) for old-age insurance benefits 
or Title XVI of the Social Security Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 1381 for aged 
individuals.”  Id.  Requiring eligibility under Social Security, the Senate suggested that it 
was more comfortable granting statutory benefits to a defined group that already 
received other benefits due to their status. 
 142. Id. at 13. 
The problem [referring to health care] is the same for heterosexual couples, 
same-sex couples, and elderly couples who form committed and exclusive 
relationships, proponents say.  AB 26 would ensure that ‘unmarried couples 
will not be denied access to health benefits for their partner solely because of 
their sexual orientation or marital status.’ 
Id.  (quoting Assemblywoman Migden). 
 143. Id. 
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any other provision of this section [referring to section 297 of the 
California Family Code], persons of opposite sexes may not constitute a 
domestic partnership unless both persons are over the age of 62.”144  
This was the language included in the chaptered version of the bill, 
finally signed by the governor.145 
Only four months after Governor Davis’s approval of AB 26, an 
attempt at expansion of the domestic partnership eligibility began anew.  
Again authored by Assemblywoman Migden, AB 2421 began as 
legislation to provide greater substantive rights to then existing domestic 
partnerships.146 
In its first amendment, all substantive changes were dropped and AB 
2421 became purely a proposed change to domestic partnership 
eligibility.147  Its only effect, had it passed, would have been to expand 
domestic partnership eligibility to opposite-sex couples, as long as one 
member was over the age of sixty-two.148 
Once again, the only commentary offered in support of this expansion 
is a reference to the 1990 census.149  In fact, throughout the lives of both 
AB 26 and AB 2421, the census statistics are the only support provided 
for either expansion or for restriction to exclude younger opposite-sex 
couples.150 
Governor Davis’s veto gave no further explanation as to the policy 
behind these changes.  Instead, he merely offered, “I am not willing to 
make any changes to this Act at this time.”151 
 
 144. Assemb. B. 26, 1999 Leg., 1999–2000 Sess. (Cal. 1999) (as amended Sept. 7, 
1999). 
 145. Id. (chaptered and approved by the governor on Oct. 2, 1999). 
 146. Assemb. B. 2421, 2000 Leg., 1999–2000 Sess. (Cal. 2000).  The initial version 
of the bill authorized anatomical gifts between domestic partners, sick leave, and certain 
unemployment insurance benefits related to absence from work to care for a domestic 
partner.  Id. (as introduced Feb. 24, 2000). 
 147. Id. (as amended Apr. 6, 2000). 
 148. Id.; see also id. (as enrolled). 
 149. Domestic Partnerships: Hearing on AB 2421 Before the Senate Judiciary 
Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000), http://www.leginfo.ca. gov/pub/99-
00/bill/asm/ab_2401-450/ab_2421_cfa_20000621_132355_sen_comm.html (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2003).  The census report provided that, “there are approximately 500,000 
unmarried couples in California, 93% of which are heterosexual couples and 7% of 
which are same sex couples.  Of the 500,000 unmarried couples, 35,000 are senior 
citizen couples who are not married because of social security or other pension 
restrictions.”  Id. 
 150. Compare id. (allowing opposite-sex couples with one elderly partner to 
register), with Assemb. B. 26 § 1 (as amended Aug. 8, 1999) (forbidding any opposite-
sex couple from inclusion in the domestic partnership scheme. 
 151. Veto Message from Cal. Gov. Gray Davis, Assemb. B. 2421 (Sept. 24, 2000), 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_2401-2450/ab_2421_vt_20000924.html 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2003).  The preceding paragraph indicates that one reason for the 
veto might have been the recent passage of AB 26.  “I signed legislation last year to 
establish the procedures for the registration of domestic partnership in California.”  Id. 
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The legislative history of AB 25 itself provides no greater explanation 
of the policies underlying domestic partnership eligibility.  The legislation 
does offer some indication as to why the substantive rights are included; 
however, there is virtually no mention of who might be entitled to those 
rights or why the legislature made choices of inclusion and exclusion. 
As of its introduction, the 2000 version of domestic partnership 
legislation offered to expand the class of eligible couples to include those in 
which only one partner is over age sixty-two.152  Once again, however, 
the comments following the bill’s readings highlight that there is no clear 
purpose or explanation for individual eligibility.  The bill’s author, the 
assembly, the senate, and the governor each seem to have a different 
approach.  There is no guiding principle, at least not an apparent one.  
Comments from the March 13, 2001 hearing on the proposed bill posed 
the following as one of two key issues: “Should the group of individuals 
who may register as domestic partners be expanded to include opposite sex 
couples where only one individual, rather than both, is over the age of 62?”153 
In response to that question, the Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
merely referred to Assemblywoman Migden’s statement, a statement 
that makes no reference whatsoever to opposite-sex couples, nor gives 
any purpose for their exclusion or inclusion.154  It is an odd silence to 
follow a specific question posed by the legislature. 
This legislative history, although not completely explicative, suggests 
at least three potential explanations for the expansion of eligibility in 
California’s domestic partnership scheme.  Three possibilities are 
explored in the following Part, informed by legislative history, the 
development of the California model, and the differences between the 
models of California and other jurisdictions. 
 
 152. Assemb. B. 25, 2000–01 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (as introduced).  No 
other changes were suggested in the eligibility or definition portion of the legislation.  Id. 
 153. Domestic Partners: Hearing on AB 25 Before the Cal. Assembly Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 2000–01 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-
02/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_25_cfa_20010309_170135_asm_comm.html (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2003). 
 154. Id. 
This bill seeks to expand the group of individuals who can register as, and 
confer a number of new legal rights on, domestic partners, to the same extent 
such rights are guaranteed to married couples.  In commenting on the need for 
this measure, the author states, ‘[U]ntil the enactment of AB 26 in 1999, same 
sex couples and their families received no recognition under California law. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The author mentioned only the substantive rights that the bill 
would offer to registered domestic partners. 
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V.  ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY BEHIND THE EXPANSION OF ELIGIBILITY 
On its face, there is no expressed policy in AB 25 regarding the 
expansion of eligibility, from opposite-sex couples in which both 
partners are over age sixty-two, to opposite-sex couples in which at least 
one partner is over age sixty-two.  Nor is a concrete policy in support of 
expansion expressed in the legislative history of the bill.155  As the 
author, Assemblywoman Migden, claimed in Internet promotion of the 
legislation, certain benefits are presented to the people of California and 
to the elderly in general.  However, these benefits are not expressed as 
the reason behind the expansion.156 
There are three potential policies supporting the expansion to include 
more couples within the reach of the domestic partnership statutes, 
specifically those couples in which only one partner is over age sixty-
two and eligible for social security benefits.  Each of these three will be 
discussed in turn, and, finally, suggestions are offered to clarify the 
intent behind the continued expansion of eligible couples.  Initially, 
however, this Part will briefly describe some of the elemental concepts 
of social security and social benefits that influence the policy of 
expansion.157 
By requiring that at least one member of an opposite-sex couple be 
over age sixty-two and eligible for social security benefits,158 the 
domestic partnership statute calls into issue the policies behind 
eligibility for those benefits.  The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
program (OASI)159 “provides monthly cash benefits to retired workers 
and their dependents and to survivors of covered workers.”160  OASI is 
the largest of the social benefit programs and is the program commonly 
referred to as Social Security.161  OASI was primarily established to 
protect workers over retirement age, age sixty-two at the earliest, who 
have worked in covered employment for over ten years; additionally, 
 
 155. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 156. See Assemblywoman Carole Migden, AB 25 Fact Sheet, at http://democrats. 
assembly.ca.gov/members/a13/issues/ab25FACT.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (on file 
with author). 
 157. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to offer an in depth discussion of old 
age security benefits, disability benefits, or Medicare and Medicaid.  Each of these topics 
has been studied in great detail in other law review articles. 
 158. AB 25 requires that person to be over age sixty-two and to “meet eligibility 
criteria under Title II of Social Security Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 402(a) for 
old-age insurance benefits or Title XVI of Social Security Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1381 for aged individuals.”  Assemb. B. 25, § 3, 2000–01 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2001); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6)(B) (West Supp. 2003). 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 401–434 (2000). 
 160. Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Social Security Work for Women and Men, 16 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 359, 362 (1999). 
 161. Id. 
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dependents and survivors of the worker may receive additional monthly 
income under the program, based upon the worker’s primary insurance 
amount.162  For married couples, then, social security functions as a joint 
and two-thirds survivor annuity.163 
The other social benefit program referenced in domestic partnership 
legislation is the Supplemental Security Income (SSI).164  SSI provides 
monthly cash benefits to low income elderly Americans, as well as to the 
blind and disabled.165  The purpose of SSI is explicitly stated as 
providing security income to these persons;166 however, the statute’s 
interpretive notes suggest that security is intended only “to cover basic 
necessities, but not medical expenses.”167  SSI does not immediately 
raise concerns of marital status, although eligibility for SSI guarantees 
eligibility for Medicaid coverage.168  In turn, Medicaid eligibility is 
potentially affected by marital status.169 
A.  Offering an Alternative to Marriage and Cohabitation 
At the most basic level, an expansion of domestic partnership 
eligibility appears, simply, to broaden its application to as many people 
as possible.  Scholars have suggested that the modern American family 
is changing its face at a rapid pace and in many different directions.170  
 
 162. Id. at 363–64; see also Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose Pension Is It Anyway? 
Protecting Spousal Rights in a Privatized Social Security System, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 
1654–57 (1998). 
 163. Forman, supra note 160, at 365; see also Forman, supra note 162, at 1678–80 
(discussing how the joint and two-thirds annuity would be affected by an amendment to 
social security to allow for individual retirement savings account (IRSA) and how IRSAs 
would remove a marriage penalty). 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 1381–1383f (2000). 
 165. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (2000). 
 166. Id. (“For the purpose of establishing a national program to provide 
supplemental security income to individuals who have attained age 65 or are blind or 
disabled, there are authorized to be appropriated sums sufficient to carry out this 
title . . . .”). 
 167. See id. at Interpretive Notes and Decisions, 1 (citing Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 
154 (1986)). 
 168. See id. at Interpretative Notes and Decisions, 3 (citing Hayes v. Stanton, 512 
F.2d 133 (1975)). 
 169. See Medically Needy Income Standard, 42 C.F.R. § 435.811 (2001) (requiring 
that Medicaid eligibility be determined on the basis of a single income standard). 
 170. See generally Blumberg, supra note 85 (tracing the development of American 
nonmarital cohabitation in terms of the American welfare state); Martha M. Ertman, 
Commentary: The ALI Principles’ Approach to Domestic Partnership, 8 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 107 (2001) (offering helpful descriptions of nontraditional but likely 
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More often, couples cohabitate, rather than marry, as the divorce rate 
climbs ever higher.171  Thus, expanding the statutory option for family 
recognition to more couples might be practical. 
This first proffered policy behind expansion can be eliminated fairly 
quickly.  If the policy were indeed to offer a middle ground between 
cohabitation and marriage, the statute entirely fails to address the issue.  
It provides no such alternative to opposite-sex couples with partners 
between the ages of eighteen and sixty-two.172 
It is possible, of course, that the expansion reflects a gradual trend 
toward the inclusion of any couple that meets the other non-age, 
nongender requirements.173  However, this seems unlikely.  If the 
eventual goal were to provide all couples with the option of domestic 
partnership registration, there seems no reason to initially exclude such a 
well-numbered and well-represented group: middle aged, opposite-sex 
couples. 
B.  Preventing Criticism Through Inclusion 
A second possible policy driving the expansion of eligible opposite- 
sex couples is the desire to divert attention from the true or initial policy 
of the domestic partnership: to benefit gay and lesbian couples.  Despite 
criticism that the domestic partnership does not go far enough in its 
recognition of same-sex couples,174 many still urgently oppose any 
efforts, especially legal ones, to support gay, lesbian, or same-sex 
couples.175  Some proponents of the advancement of same-sex couple 
 
households), WL 8 DUKEJGLP 107; Katz, supra note 69; Nancy K. Ota, Symposium, 
“Family” and the Political Landscape for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
People (LGBT): Opening Remarks, 64 ALB. L. REV. 889 (2001). 
 171. See Blumberg, supra note 85, at 1271–75. 
 172. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2003). 
 173. 84 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 55, 57 (2001).  This approach is tangentially suggested 
in an opinion by California Attorney General Lockyer.  He discusses the purpose of the 
registration as the distribution of government benefits and uses this policy as partial 
justification for making residential addresses of domestic partners publicly available 
through the secretary of state.  Id. at 58. 
 174. Several authors comment that the only truly equal protection for gay and 
lesbian couples is marriage, and some suggest that any solution short of marriage is a 
failure.  See Press Release, California Western School of Law, supra note 3 (quoting 
Professor Barbara Cox: “I would prefer to see the legislature focus on a comprehensive 
marriage law to end the discrimination against same-sex couples . . . .”); see also Press 
Release, People For the American Way, supra note 67 (quoting Ralph G. Neas, President 
of People For the American Way: “Even strong domestic partnership laws are no 
substitute for full and equal marriage rights.”). 
 175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West Supp. 2002); 
Lynn D. Wardle, Essay: “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in 
Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771 (2001); 
Press Release, Campaign for California Families, Statement on Governor Davis’ 
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recognition may be willing to pad the early legislative efforts in order to 
gain immediate benefits.  Some supporters of gay and lesbian rights 
might be willing to use opposite-sex inclusion in the statute as a fig leaf 
cover, to shield the young legislation from traditional criticism. 
In fact, the most compelling support for this explanation of the policy 
behind expanded opposite-sex couple eligibility comes from its own 
author.  Assemblywoman Migden’s press release on the date of the 
governor’s signature offered a description of the added substantive 
rights, and then she added: “This bill marks a stellar advance for lesbians 
and gays in California.”176 
Given an opportunity to discuss who will benefit from the new law, 
she mentioned only same-sex couples.  The comment continued, “[The 
bill] recognizes important everyday rights under the law that affect all 
individuals and their families.  This new law sends a message across the 
nation that California celebrates the dignity and diversity of all people, 
including same sex couples.”177  Surely opposite-sex couples in which 
one partner is elderly are included within the reference to “dignity and 
diversity of all people,” but her silence on the expansion seems pregnant 
in light of publication of the legislation’s developments in other areas of 
the prior version. 
Additionally, Migden said that AB 25 provides “basic protections” to 
gay, lesbian, and senior citizen families.178  Her comments continue, 
however, to suggest that the true value of the bill is in the additional 
rights that it affords to same-sex couples.179  Finally, a telephone 
discussion with one of Migden’s aides revealed that the expansion came 
as a direct response to the criticism lodged at efforts to create a statutory 
recognition of gay and lesbian couples.180 
 
Signing of AB 25 (Oct. 14, 2001), http://www.savecalifornia.com/press/newsreleases 
/release.cfm?nrid=PR011014A (last visited Feb. 6, 2003). 
 176. Press Release, Assemblywoman Carole Migden, 13th Assembly District, 
Governor Davis Signs Migden Bill Expanding Domestic Partner Rights (Oct. 22, 2001), 
http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/members/a13/press2001/p132001019.html (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2002) (on file with author).  But see infra notes 177–78 and accompanying text. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Assemblywoman Carole Migden, Assemblywoman Carole Migden’s 
Legislation, San Francisco, at http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/members/a13/a13leg 
2001.htm  (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (on file with author). 
 179. Id. (“AB 25 provides important employment, health care, and estate planning 
rights currently denied same-sex couples, including the ability to seek compensation for 
the loss of economic or emotional support, make medical decisions in the hospital, and 
act as a Conservator to tend to a partner’s medical and financial needs.”). 
 180. Telephone Interview with Kirsten Boyd, Assistant to California 
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The expansion appears to be a shield to prevent criticism of a liberal 
platform or to improve the acceptance of the legislation, if one considers 
that the minimum age requirement of sixty-two seems arbitrary with 
respect to the age at which opposite-sex senior citizens might wish for an 
alternative to marriage.  If the purpose behind expansion were truly to 
protect the income of those couples who would lose survivor benefits by 
remarrying,181 then the statute fails to accomplish that policy for couples 
aged sixty.  This inconsistency tends to indicate that the inclusion of 
elderly opposite-sex couples serves a purpose unrelated to protecting 
their benefits. 
If this policy were in fact the impetus behind expansion, problems 
arise.  First, the inclusion of opposite-sex couples constitutes a sham of 
sorts.182  If the real purpose for expansion and inclusion of more 
opposite-sex couples is to avoid criticism from voters who would oppose 
domestic partnerships were they only available to same-sex couples, as 
reflected in public opinion polls, then Californians are misled by the 
current legislation.  It appears, on the face of AB 25, that a crisis may exist 
for retirement-aged opposite-sex couples.  If that is the case, then social 
security reform should take place nationwide, to address these couples in 
need, regardless of state residency.  If such a crisis does not exist, then 
the current domestic partnership scheme needlessly includes senior 
citizen couples and needlessly excludes all other opposite-sex couples. 
Therein lies the second problem.  The expansion represents an overt 
disservice to opposite-sex couples who do not qualify under the age and 
social security requirements but would wish for a state-sanctioned 
alternative to marriage.  If the only purpose for inclusion of elderly is to 
dilute the statute’s application (and in so doing to avoid criticism from 
voters who would oppose domestic partnerships if only available to 
same-sex couples), then there is no reason to exclude opposite-sex 
couples of younger years. 
 
Assemblywoman Migden, 13th Dist. (Apr. 4, 2002). 
 181. See discussion infra Part V.C. 
 182. This suggestion is supported, in part, by the first draft of the California 
Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003.  Assemb. B. 205, 2003–04 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_020 
1-0250/ab_205_bill_20030128_introduced.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).  No effort is 
made in this bill introduced in January 2003 to remove opposite-sex couples with one 
senior member from eligibility; however, the text repeatedly refers to the needs of same-
sex couples, but does not mention the special needs of senior couples or opposite-sex 
couples with only one senior member.  Id. § 1(b)(3), (6), (8).  The full text of the 
proposed legislation indicates that the purpose of the entire domestic partnership scheme 
is incremental progression towards marriage rights for same-sex couples and that 
opposite-sex senior couples, while they may face a legitimate problem with access to 
marriage, may have only been statutorily included along the way to bolster popular 
support.  See id. 
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Limiting domestic partnerships to same-sex couples without some 
stated purpose presents the problem of discrimination and equal 
protection challenges.183  Such a challenge requires raising the gender 
discrimination of both the complainant and her domestic partner by a 
policy that recognizes only same-sex couples.184  Therefore, the 
challenge is a gender based, couple challenge, rather than an individual 
one.  At least in the employment setting, under Title VII law, there is 
indication that domestic partnerships may not be limited to same-sex 
couples alone.185 
In conclusion, inclusion by default is rarely the preferred method of 
advancing legal theory or civil rights.  In failing to defend a substantive 
policy throughout the development of the domestic partnership scheme 
and by repeated reference to polls throughout the legislative history,186 
the California Legislature and Governor Davis have convinced the 
Author: the inclusion of opposite-sex couples, in any regard, seems 
politically motivated, in the most superficial sense of the phrase. 
C.  Offering a Remedy: Is “Practically Prevented” from Marrying the 
Same as “Prohibited” from Marrying? 
The most valid of policies behind the current scheme would explain 
both the inclusion of opposite-sex couples to a limited degree, as well as 
the expansion to allow couples in which only one partner is over sixty-
two and OASI or SSI eligible.  The California Legislature might have 
determined that same-sex couples required a statutorily created 
alternative to marriage in order to gain important civic benefits because 
marriage is not available; similarly then, the statutory option should be 
available to opposite-sex couples in which at least one partner would lose 
eligibility to OASI survivor benefits by remarrying or who would lose SSI 
benefits by marrying a person with an additional source of income. 
Is marriage sufficiently unavailable as an option to opposite-sex 
couples in which one partner is elderly to justify merging the treatment 
of those couples with same-sex couples who are statutorily forbidden 
 
 183. See generally Paul R. Lynd, Domestic Partnership Benefits Limited to Same-
Sex Couples: Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 561 
(2000). 
 184. Id. at 603. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
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from marrying?187  Do those two groups require similar treatment, and 
such to the exclusion of other opposite-sex couples who might face other 
marriage “penalties”?188 
In California in the year 2000, during AB 25’s amendments, 428,280 
widows and widowers received survivor benefits through OASI.189  
OASI paid out, on average, $821 per month to survivors.190  SSI paid 
benefits to 475,594 California elderly in need of supplemental income, 
and the national average payment for elderly recipients was $439 per 
month.191  As California’s overall population in 2000 was 33,872,000 
and the number of Californians over the age of sixty-five was 3,596,000, 
the domestic partnership eligibility provision could, at its widest reach, 
affect approximately ten percent of Californians.192 
Of course, not each of those individuals eligible for OASI or SSI 
draws on those benefits; of those who do collect benefits, not all would 
avoid marriage in order to retain them.  Therefore, the inclusion of these 
couples within the domestic partnership schema really applies to a 
smaller portion of Californians. 
The need, however, is also a reality, and law has never required a 
majority in need in order to provide a protection.  The need amounts to 
some portion of elderly Californians who would either (1) lose their 
benefits as surviving spouses under OASI by remarrying (but cannot 
afford to) or (2) lose their eligibility for SSI benefits by marrying an 
individual whose income was too high for the couple to remain eligible 
and too low to support both persons without the supplemental income. 
A distinction is easily made, however, between those who practically 
cannot afford to marry and those who are prohibited from marriage.  
Marriage is an alternative for elderly opposite-sex couples, even when 
financially disastrous.  Whereas, under any circumstance, a domestic 
partnership is the only means for same-sex couples to obtain state 
recognition.193  In principle, inclusion of a group that does not require 
 
 187. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West Supp. 2003). 
 188. The income tax marriage penalty is beyond the scope of this Comment; 
however, it should be noted that younger opposite-sex couples may chose to not marry in 
order to avoid financial penalties, just as elderly opposite-sex couples chose to not marry 
in order to maintain social benefits.  See David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and 
for Lovers of All Sorts, A Status Other than Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 
1355 (2001). 
 189. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF POLICY, OFFICE OF RESEARCH, 
EVALUATION, AND STATISTICS, CALIFORNIA STATE STATISTICS (2000), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/state_fact_sheets/ca.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2003). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 2001, at 21, 23 (2001). 
 193. James M. Donovan, Essay: An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic 
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the remedy dilutes the remedy’s effect for groups truly in need of a 
solution.194 
In hearings regarding the initial domestic partnership legislation, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee cited a need for the status on behalf of 
senior citizens.195  However, the Committee made a distinction between 
those who would not, and those who could not, marry; and in so doing, 
the need is clearly undermined.196  The use of proposed benefits to senior 
citizens is unconvincing as a need for an alternative to marriage.  If the 
purpose had truly been to provide a statutory remedy to those elderly 
couples who could not marry, then additional compelling data might 
have been provided in support. 
One problem with this rationale as proper support for expanded 
eligibility is a near void of popular discussion of the matter as a 
perceived problem.  Although discussion of social security abounds in 
popular media of all types on various topics,197 no one is raising a flag 
on behalf of seniors who would marry but cannot due to the reduction in 
their social benefits that would result. 
In a February 2002 hearing on improving social security for women, 
seniors, and working Americans, not one of eight panelists discussed any 
concern in this area.198  During the session, panelists vehemently 
opposed any reduction in social security benefits and urged strongly for 
the protection of benefits to women, especially widows and divorcees.199  
However, there was little mention and no debate of the benefits scheme 
currently deterring marriage or second marriages.200 
 
Partnerships to Same-Sex Couples, 8 LAW & SEX. 649, 665–68 (1998). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Domestic Partnerships: Hearing on AB 26 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 
1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 1999), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/9900/bill/ 
asm/ab_0001. 
Especially to senior citizens, cohabitation with a trusted friend, male or female, 
could give them companionship, security and independence they so need at 
this time of their lives.  Yet, many would not, or could not marry due to 
restrictions on social security or other pension benefits that would affect their 
incomes.  
Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Report on Social Security Adds 3 Years to Fund’s Life: 
Improved Outlook Due to More Productivity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at A16. 
 198. See Social Security Improvements for Women, Seniors and Working 
Americans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Ways and 
Means Comm., 107th Cong. 11–78 (2002). 
 199. Id. at 12–13. 
 200. See generally id. (focusing on strengthening the social security system’s ability 
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Of course, problems may exist without newsprint or television 
attention and without discussion in the Ways and Means Committee.  
Indeed, a lack of evidence fails to demonstrate much of anything.  It 
seems a bit odd, however, that such discussion is absent if the California 
Legislature has determined the problem sufficient to be addressed with a 
statutory alternative to marriage, hardly a minimalist approach.  
Although the domestic partnership’s application to couples with only 
one elderly partner is a development, rather than a creation of law,201 the 
expansion must have some purpose.  When a purpose appears to be 
lacking on the face of the statute, in its legislative history, and in the 
popular press, Californians ought to wonder and begin asking questions. 
It seems more likely, and less palatable, that California’s elected 
officials desire bipartisan and more widespread support for the domestic 
partnership legislation, especially in a gubernatorial election year. 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The domestic partnership has arrived.  California and Hawaii offer a 
statewide statutory alternative to marriage.  Cities in the states of New 
York and Massachusetts offer similar options, and other states, like 
Massachusetts and Arizona, are at various stages in developing state 
domestic partnership legislation.  The successful challenge of Vermont’s 
constitution and the resulting civil union legislation indicate that other 
challenges to further same-sex couples’ recognition will follow.  But 
each of these approaches differs markedly, not only in explicit statutory 
language, but also in the expressed and implied policies that underlie the 
emerging models of family. 
How will other states proceed?  How will the nation uniformly 
recognize a new family status, especially when its face changes so 
markedly by crossing state lines?  The policies that drive the definition 
of California’s domestic partnership and its resulting benefits are 
crucial. 
Initially, there will be challenges.  The issues of same-sex marriage or 
union and nontraditional families will continue to be hotly debated.  
Although much remains uncertain, legislatures can count on challenges 
to new understandings of the American family.  Once these challenges 
arise, the success or failure of the domestic partnership may turn, in part, 
upon its purpose. 
California has failed to make its purpose clear.  Comparison, 
 
to support seniors and women).  But see id. at 41 (“Another key problem facing 
divorcees, is if . . . the divorced woman remarries, she may lose all claim to benefits 
based on her previous marriage.”). 
 201. See discussion supra Part III. 
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legislative history and analysis, and Governor Davis’s message upon 
enactment indicate, however, that the California domestic partnership 
may include opposite-sex couples for less than compelling reasons. 
Without clarification, the current domestic partnership model remains 
open to an equal protection attack from nonretirement aged opposite-sex 
couples.  It remains open to criticism from same-sex couple advocates 
because the domestic partnership fails to provide an adequate remedy to 
same-sex couples, or because the remedy is diluted by offering opposite-
sex couples an unnecessary alternative to marriage.  Finally, the current 
model suggests that the California Legislature and the governor have 
tried to gain the approval of Californians on a lukewarm solution to real 
problems with emerging understandings of family. 
In order to salvage the domestic partnership, the legislature needs to 
clarify its intent.  Either the domestic partnership is available to 
everyone as an alternative to marriage and cohabitation, or it exists 
temporarily as a remedy to same-sex couples who are truly prevented 
from marrying.  In either case, the substance of the model requires fine-
tuning. 
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